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INTRODUCTION
Since implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2014, 32 states have ex-
panded or announced plans to expand the income eligibility of their Medicaid programs as authorized by the 
law.1  Twenty-six of these states, including the Commonwealth of Kentucky, have expanded or plan to expand 
their Medicaid programs through a traditional approach as envisioned by the ACA, and six states currently 
have expanded Medicaid programs through an alternative approach allowed under Section 1115 of the Social 
Security Act.2  
Kentucky’s newly elected Governor Matt Bevin has announced plans to seek an alternative approach to 
Kentucky’s current Medicaid expansion through a waiver from certain federal Medicaid rules, referred to as 
a Section 1115 waiver.  A transition from its traditional expansion to an 1115 waiver-based expansion would 
make Kentucky somewhat unique. To date, only New Hampshire has transitioned from a traditional to a 
waiver-based expansion; and unlike Kentucky, that state’s traditional expansion was planned as a temporary 
step until the state implemented a waiver-based expansion. Similar to Kentucky, Arizona and Ohio have an-
nounced intentions to transition from traditional to waiver-based expansions, but they have not yet received 
federal approval.
This brief was written to inform the policy discussion about the specifics of an 1115 waiver in Kentucky by ex-
amining the main components of Medicaid expansion waivers from other states. We selected five states with 
existing Medicaid expansion waivers that most-closely aligned with the policy discussion within Kentucky. 
Among the study states, their waivers incorporated similar components, although the details vary from state 
to state. We found mixed results on the potential of the specific waiver activities to impact either access to 
health coverage and services or costs for newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries.
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BACKGROUND
Section 1115 of the Social Security Act gives the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) authority to waive certain federal Medicaid requirements, allowing states the flexibility to 
modify their Medicaid programs and Children’s Health Insurance Programs (CHIP).3,4  Section 1115 waivers 
are authorized as time-limited demonstration projects designed to test various policy approaches and are 
typically approved for a period of five years.5,6  Historically, states have used Section 1115 waivers to adjust 
eligibility rules, restructure benefits, modify provider payments, address specific populations or services, or 
extend coverage during an emergency.7 
While the Secretary has broad authority for 
approving these waivers, HHS follows certain 
ground rules, some of which are set in statute 
and some of which are based on long-standing 
administrative policy:
1. The waivers must meet the overall 
objectives of the Medicaid program to 
increase access, improve outcomes and 
increase efficiency.6
2. The demonstration must include an 
evaluation component.8
3. Public input and comment must be 
sought in advance of federal approval.
4. The state must demonstrate that the 
alternative approach is budget-neutral to 
the federal government.9
Given the Secretary’s broad authority for ap-
proving Section 1115 waivers, it can be difficult 
to determine whether a specific waiver pro-
vision proposed by a state will be approved. 
However, by reviewing approval patterns, 
some indication of federal restrictions have 
emerged. Table 1 summarizes some of the 
more common provisions that have been pro-
posed and subsequently approved or rejected. 
SECTION 1115 AND THE ACA: EXPERIENCES FROM FIVE STATES
To date, 32 states have implemented or announced intentions to implement the Medicaid expansion as set 
forth by the ACA. Seven of these states have used 1115 waiver authority to implement expansion through an 
alternative approach, although Pennsylvania has since shifted to a traditional expansion.2 This brief focuses 
on the main components of demonstrations from five states (Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan and Mon-
tana) that have used 1115 waivers to expand their Medicaid programs with provisions specifically relevant to 
policy discussions in Kentucky. Key components of the waivers in include:
• Premium Assistance: Using Medicaid dollars to support the purchase of private health insurance 
coverage; 
• Enrollee Contributions:  Requiring beneficiaries to pay monthly health insurance “premiums” or con-
tribute to Health Savings Accounts;11 
TABLE 1. 
Overview of  
Approved and 
Denied Provisions 






Waiving certain benefi ts (e.g., non-emergency 
medical transportati on)
Limited penalti es for non-payment of premiums 
(e.g., imposing cost-sharing or reduced benefi ts for 
benefi ciaries at or below 100% of FPG, disenrolling 
benefi ciaries with incomes above 100% of FPG)
Healthy behavior incenti ves 
Denied Provisions
Requiring employment or work program referral
Imposing cost-sharing in amounts greater than 
allowed under federal regulati ons*
Waiving other benefi ts (e.g., EPSDT for enrollees 
under age 21, and free-choice of family planning 
providers)
Disenrollment penalti es for non-payment of pre-
miums by lower-income enrollees (below 100% 
of FPG)
*States must meet separate cost-sharing waiver requirements under Secti on 1916(f) 
authority to impose higher cost-sharing. Indiana received Secti on 1916(f) approval to 
charge greater than the $8 maximum cost-sharing amount allowed for non-emergent 
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• Modified Cost-Sharing:  Instituting cost-sharing (e.g., co-pays) in ways that differ from typical Medicaid 
policies, including cost-sharing that exceeds standard federal limits;
• Healthy Behavior Incentives:  Offering incentives for beneficiaries to engage in healthy behaviors, such 
as tobacco-cessation and health risk assessments; and 
•  Waive Required Covered Benefits:  Excluding certain benefits that typically are required in Medicaid, 
specifically non-emergency medical transportation (NEMT). 
Table 2 provides information on the key 1115 waiver components by study state and notes when the provi-
sions are specifically designated as mandatory or voluntary for beneficiaries. We then provide more detail 
on each of the study components, including implementation details, along with relevant  research findings, 
when they are available. A more-detailed comparison of states’ waiver policies is included in Appendix I.
Selected 
States
Premium assistance Enrollee premiums/ 








Marketplace Employer Premiums HSA 
contributi ons
Arkansas M M
Indiana V M M V M
Iowa M1 M M V M
Michigan V2 M M V
Montana M
M-mandatory; V-voluntary
1: While Iowa received approval and implemented Marketplace premium assistance in the fi rst and second years of its waiver, it has since disconti nued this component.
2: Michigan does not currently off er Marketplace premium assistance, but the state has received approval to begin off ering this opti on in 2018.
TABLE 2. 
Components of  
Section 1115  
Waivers in  
Selected States
PREMIUM ASSISTANCE
Four of the five study states we examined are using 1115 waivers for premium assistance to support the 
purchase of private insurance using Medicaid funds, an approach that pre-dates the ACA (e.g., Health Insur-
ance Premium Payment (HIPP) Program).12 These programs provide premium support for the purchase of 
either employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), such as in Iowa and Indiana, or Qualified Health Plan (QHP) cov-
erage through Health Insurance Marketplaces (Arkansas, Iowa and Michigan). Table 2 provides information 
on premium assistance and other waiver provisions by study state, including whether they are mandatory 
or voluntary.
ESI premium assistance
For ESI premium assistance, states use Medicaid dollars to pay the worker’s share of premiums when Med-
icaid-eligible individuals are offered health insurance by their employers. Both Iowa and Indiana employ ESI 
premium assistance, although Iowa makes it mandatory. Potential benefits of this approach are possible cost 
savings to states by leveraging employer contributions to health insurance coverage, and the enhancement 
of continuity of care by reducing movement between Medicaid and ESI due to changes in enrollees income 
and allowing enrollees to continue their existing relationships with providers.13 
Marketplace premium assistance
Under the Marketplace premium assistance approach, sometimes called the “private option,” states use 
Medicaid funds to purchase private health insurance for eligible beneficiaries through the Marketplaces cre-
ated by the Affordable Care Act. This approach has been used in Arkansas, Iowa and Michigan, although 
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the details of each program vary. For example, Arkansas enrolls newly eligible beneficiaries in Marketplace 
coverage regardless of income, but Iowa only required premium assistance for those with incomes above 
100% of FPG.14 
Arguments in favor
• Potential benefits of ESI premium assistance are possible cost savings to states by leveraging employer 
contributions to health insurance coverage; the enhancement of continuity of care by reducing move-
ment between Medicaid and ESI due to changes in enrollees income, allowing enrollees to continue 
their existing relationships with their health care providers and potentially allow families to enroll in 
the same health plan.13  In addition, the higher reimbursement rates offered through private plans may 
increase access to providers.  
• Using Medicaid funds to purchase private coverage on the Health Insurance Marketplace, could poten-
tially increase enrollment in private QHPs. A larger potential pool of enrollees could improve the risk 
profile and encourage more health plan participation.15  This in turn could lead to increased competition 
among health plans, resulting in greater consumer choice and decreased costs within the Marketplaces.
• In addition, the approach of Marketplace premium assistance could improve continuity of care for in-
dividuals who “churn” in and out of Medicaid eligibility due to income fluctuations.15  Enrollees could 
potentially keep the same Marketplace plans, with premium support through advance premium tax 
credits and cost-sharing subsidies rather than Medicaid funds.
• If a state’s Marketplace offers enough plans and network options, then Marketplace premium assis-
tance may also offer beneficiaries with more choices of health care providers.16
• Premium assistance also could help states manage a large increase in enrollees by “relying on the pri-
vate market,” particularly in cases where states have limited administrative capacity or availability of 
Medicaid providers.16
Arguments against
• Premium assistance programs can be administratively complex and potentially difficult to implement 
because states are “required to provide wrap-around coverage for benefits that are not covered in the 
private market plan(s), cover the cost of any additional premiums and cost sharing, and complete an 
assessment of cost effectiveness.”16,17,18
• Another issue adding to the administrative complexity of premium assistance programs is that states 
must develop and implement a process to identify enrollees who are medically frail and offer them the 
option of enrolling in traditional Medicaid.16
• If a state’s Marketplace has limited options in plans and provider networks, this could restrict benefi-
ciaries’ choices.
Relevant evidence
While the premium assistance approach is not new to Medicaid, it has not been adopted by many states, and 
those that have established programs cover a relatively small number of enrollees.16  Additionally, there has 
been limited evaluation research.
• A study of ESI premium assistance in CHIP found that the policy was administratively complex to imple-
ment.19  For example, the state must determine if workers have employer offers of coverage and gather 
details such as premium amounts and employer contributions. 
• Research on an early premium assistance program in New Mexico found that support in paying premi-
ums can increase health insurance enrollment.20 
          STATE HEALTH ACCESS DATA ASSISTANCE CENTER6
• An analysis of data from the National Health Interview Survey found that lower-income workers are less 
likely to be offered coverage by their employers, with only 37% who have incomes under 100% of FPG 
receiving offers in 2014.21
• It may be difficult for states to demonstrate budget neutrality to the federal government if the private 
coverage they purchase is more expensive than traditional Medicaid. One analysis found that premium 
assistance could cost 20-40% more.22
• A 2013 study found that Marketplace premium assistance could reduce churn between Medicaid and 
the Marketplace by nearly two-thirds in states with restrictive Medicaid for adults.23
REQUIRING ENROLLEE PREMIUMS OR CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS
Enrollee premiums and contributions have been suggested as ways to encourage personal responsibility, and 
potential benefits include familiarizing beneficiaries with concepts of private insurance and helping them 
to develop skills in managing health care costs.24  Under federal Medicaid rules, states may impose certain 
forms of cost-sharing (discussed below), but states are not allowed to impose premiums on newly eligible 
beneficiaries without a waiver.25  Each of the five states we examined used 1115 waiver authority to impose 
monthly premiums or require beneficiaries to contribute to health savings accounts. However, the programs 
vary considerably across the following components:
• Who is expected to pay (e.g., all enrollees, or those with incomes over 100% of FPG)?
• What are the penalties for non-payment (e.g., cancelation of coverage, new or higher cost-sharing, 
reduced benefits)?
• How are the enrollee contributions structured (e.g., premiums assessments, or contributions to Health 
Savings Accounts)?
For a more-detailed state-by-state comparison of 1115 waiver components, see Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 shows 
whether states require premiums or HSA contributions, at what income levels they require these contribu-
tions, and Table 4 shows what penalties states impose for non-payment of contributions. For example, all 
study states consider unpaid enrollee contributions to be a debt to the state, and some levy additional pen-
alties, such as additional cost-sharing or program disenrollment.
Monthly premiums
Three of the states we examined imposed premiums on Medicaid expansion enrollees as part of their 
1115 waivers (Iowa, Michigan and Montana). The states target different income groups and require varying 
amounts. For example, Montana sets premiums at 2% of monthly income for beneficiaries with incomes over 
50% of FPG, and Michigan requires premiums of 2% of monthly income for enrollees with incomes over 100% 
of FPG. In contrast, Iowa charges $5 per month for enrollees with incomes between 50-100% of FPG, and $10 
per month for those with incomes 101% of FPG or higher. Additionally, the states also address non-payment 
of premiums in different ways (e.g., disenrollment and allowing beneficiaries to re-enroll vs. disenrollment 
with a lock-out period). For a summary comparison of these differences, see Tables 3 and 4. 
Health Savings Account contributions
Three of the study states require monthly contributions to Health Savings Accounts (HSAs)26 through their 
1115 waivers (Arkansas, Indiana and Michigan), with variation in each state’s implementation approach (see 
Tables 3 and 4). For example, Indiana requires contributions of $1 per month for enrollees with incomes at or 
below 5% of FPG or 2% of monthly income for those with income more than 5% of FPG.  Arkansas requires 
monthly contributions between $10-25 per month (depending on income) for enrollees with incomes of 
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100% of FPG or more.  Michigan requires quarterly HSA contributions based on enrollees’ use of health care 
services (effectively cost-sharing paid into HSAs, rather than co-pays made to providers), which are required 
for enrollees of all incomes. 
Arguments in favor
• Premium and HSA contributions could potentially improve the financial sustainability of public pro-
grams while limiting the impact on enrollees by restraining the amount of contributions.27
• Because requiring financial participation is designed to foster personal responsibility and ownership 
over health care use among low-income individuals, it could potentially better-prepare families to ulti-
mately enroll in private insurance, in which premiums are routine.27,24
• If premiums or HSA contributions and other cost-sharing is required for Medicaid coverage, individuals 
may be less likely to cancel existing private health insurance to obtain Medicaid coverage.28
Arguments against
• Requiring financial contributions could discourage individuals from enrolling in Medicaid and could 
increase instability of coverage if enrollees do not pay the required contributions.   
• Administering premium or HSA contributions could potentially be costly, considering the large number 
of enrollees and small number of monthly transactions that would need to be managed.24
• Although states may experience savings from implementing premium or HSA contribution and cost-shar-
ing provisions, these may accrue due to declines in coverage and utilization more than from increases 
in revenues.29
Relevant evidence
• There is evidence to suggest that low-income individuals are highly sensitive to premiums, and that 
requiring beneficiaries to pay contributions may reduce enrollment among those in programs such as 
Medicaid and CHIP.24,30,31,32,33,29,34 A study that included Kentucky found decreased enrollment in the com-
monwealth’s KCHIP program when the program instituted premiums for some beneficiaries in 2003.35
• Adding new premiums and strictly enforcing them is associated with larger declines in enrollment and 
an increase in administrative barriers for individuals wishing to re-enroll.27,24
• In a precursor program to Indiana’s waiver, the state’s original Healthy Indiana Plan, 12% of enrollees 
were disenrolled from the program for non-payment to their HSAs—most of whom had incomes at or 
below 100% of FPG.36 Although, Indiana’s current waiver does not disenroll beneficiaries at or below 
100% of FPG for non-payment.
• In 2003, after Oregon increased premiums and cost-sharing, and instituted a lock-out penalty for 
non-payment in one Medicaid Plan, it experienced a decline in enrollment, and a state study found that 
72% of those who were disenrolled remained uninsured.37 
• Requiring premiums also is associated with a reduced length of Medicaid enrollment for both adults 
and children, and this may be due to the existence of the premium requirement rather than the amount 
of the required payment.38 
• The revenue collected by premiums often is not enough to offset the administrative costs of collecting 
fees, tracking payments, sending notices, and imposing non-payment penalties.24
• A 2013 review found that replacing employers’ existing plans with a high-deductible plan that includ-
ed an HSA reduced the plan’s total health care spending by 25 percent in the first year, due to lower 
utilization of services.39 Although, it’s not clear how these findings translate to a low-income Medicaid 
population, or to programs without high deductibles.  
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MODIFIED COST-SHARING
Under federal rules for the Medicaid program, states can require some cost-sharing from beneficiaries, such 
as co-pays for provider appointments and prescription medications, which is designed to prevent individuals 
from overusing or seeking unnecessary health care. However, each of the five states examined in this brief 
used waiver authority to impose cost-sharing for newly eligible enrollees in ways that depart from typical 
Medicaid policies. For example, some states have imposed cost-sharing as a penalty for non-payment of 
premiums or HSA contributions. Additionally, one notable example is found in Indiana, which obtained ad-
ditional waiver authority under Section 1916(f) to impose cost-sharing that exceeds federal regulations on 
maximum co-pay amounts.40 The state used this provision to adopt a scheme of “graduated” cost-sharing for 
non-emergency use of emergency department (ED) services, charging beneficiaries $8 the first time and $25 
for subsequent non-emergency use of the ED.
Arguments in favor
• Cost-sharing is intended to reduce overuse or unnecessary use of health care services, leading to reduc-
tions in program expenditures and potential cost-savings to the Medicaid program.
• Introducing cost-sharing in Medicaid programs may provide enrollees with experience with concepts 









0-50% FPG 51-100% FPG 101-138%FPG
Arkansas X X1
Indiana X X X X
Iowa X X X
Michigan X X X X X2
Montana X X X
1: Other study states use an income threshold of 101% of FPG, but Arkansas uses 100% of FPG.












upon fi rst 
contributi on
Arkansas X X
Indiana X X1 X1 X2 X2 X3
Iowa X X
Michigan X
Montana X X X
1: For benefi ciaries with incomes of 100% of FPG or below, Indiana provides a reduced benefi t set and requires cost-sharing.
2: For benefi ciaries with incomes of 101% of FPG or above, Indiana disenrolls them from the Medicaid program and locks them out of coverage for 6 months.
3: For applicants with incomes of 100% of FPG or below, Indiana enrolls them upon receipt of fi rst premium, or aft er a 60-day waiti ng period if they don’t make a 
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Arguments against
• Implementing cost-sharing may increase the risk of enrollees avoiding or delaying needed medical care, 
which could increase their need for services and require higher-cost care later.29,16
• Similar to provisions for premiums and HSA contributions, cost-sharing requires administrative systems 
for imposing and collecting payments from enrollees.24
Relevant evidence
• Studies focusing specifically on Medicaid programs have found that cost-sharing can discourage benefi-
ciaries from obtaining necessary health services, and that cost-sharing is associated with higher unmet 
needs for health care and greater financial strain.41,42
• However, the RAND Corporation health insurance experiment found that cost-sharing for those with 
private health insurance coverage had little or no effect on health outcomes, except for the lowest-in-
come individuals, and it found that beneficiary satisfaction is similar between plans with and without 
cost-sharing.43
• In 2003, the Oregon Health Plan experienced a dramatic decline in enrollment after premiums and 
cost-sharing were increased. Medicaid administrative data showed a 46% enrollment decline in the 10 
months after the change was implemented, with 44% of those who left the program naming cost-shar-
ing as the main reason they left.44 
• Studies have shown that cost sharing reduces the use of both effective and ineffective medical care 
similarly.43,29 
HEALTHY BEHAVIOR INCENTIVES
Healthy behavior incentives are intended to encourage individuals to take certain actions —such as quitting 
smoking and obtaining preventive health care services—that are aimed at improving their health and po-
tentially reducing health care costs.45 As part of their Medicaid expansion waivers, three of the study states 
(Indiana, Iowa and Michigan) adopted incentives to encourage beneficiaries to engage in healthy behaviors.46 
In these states, beneficiaries may receive reductions in or exemptions from premiums/HSA contributions 
for participating in certain behaviors, such as quitting smoking or completing a health risk assessment (see 
Appendix I).
Arguments in favor
• These programs are designed to improve the health status of Medicaid enrollees through improved 
identification of health care needs, and encouragement of healthy behaviors and the use of prevention 
services.  
• These programs have the potential to incentivize beneficiaries to take an active role in their health and 
health care by engaging in certain health-related behaviors.47
• Health assessments upon enrollment can be used to identify and target high-risk individuals who may 
benefit from care coordination and case management.  
Arguments against
• The development and implementation of incentive programs will have administrative costs, especially 
when programs aim to track enrollee adherence and outcomes.  
• It may be challenging to determine the most-effective incentive level to encourage beneficiaries to 
participate in desired behaviors.
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Relevant evidence
Although they have gained in popularity in both private employer-based insurance plans and Medicaid pro-
grams, evidence on the effects of healthy behavior incentives is currently limited.
• Healthy behavior incentives can be effective for simple interventions, such as doctor visits, vaccinations, 
and screenings; but it is more challenging to develop and administer programs to modify more-complex 
lifestyle behaviors, which have a greater potential for savings to Medicaid programs.48
• Having a regular source of physician care was found to be related to increased participation in healthy 
behavior incentive programs.27
• Health risk assessments can be used upon enrollment to identify high-need Medicaid members for 
targeted interventions and care coordination services.49
• A 2013 study of healthy behavior incentives in three states’ Medicaid programs found mixed results. For 
example, Idaho operated two wellness programs: One program provided discounted CHIP premiums 
for children who received well-child visits, which was associated with a more than doubling of adher-
ence (from 23 to 49 percent).50 The other program, which offered rewards to Medicaid enrollees who 
participated in tobacco cessation or weight-loss programs, saw relatively small participation—approxi-
mately 1,400 out of 185,000 eligible beneficiaries over two years.50 
EXCLUDED BENEFITS
Some study states have excluded certain benefits typically required in Medicaid programs, potentially to 
make Medicaid coverage more similar to private coverage.51 Under the ACA, states are required to provide 
Medicaid expansion enrollees with a set of benefits based on the 10 essential health benefits that the law 
requires of private health insurance,52 as well as unique Medicaid benefits. While the study states have pro-
posed excluding other Medicaid benefits, such as early and periodic screening, diagnostic and treatment 
(EPSDT) benefits for enrollees under age 21, HHS has only provided authority to exclude non-emergency 
medical transportation (NEMT), which provides transportation to and from health care visits. Two of the 
states described in this brief received authority under Section 1115 to waive NEMT benefits under their 
Medicaid expansion programs (Iowa and Indiana). 
Arguments in favor
• Aligning Medicaid benefits with benefits found in private health insurance can help familiarize enrollees 
with private coverage and ease transitions from public to private coverage when their incomes change.
Arguments against
• The specific benefit that study states have excluded, non-emergency medical transportation, is typically 
included in Medicaid to improve access to health care services. It is possible that excluding this benefit 
could decrease enrollees’ access to health care services.
Relevant evidence
• Each of these states initially received approval to exclude these benefits for one year, but the Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services provided both states with extensions for further study after initial 
research found small or no impacts on unmet need for transportation and whether individuals missed 
medical appointments due to a lack of transportation.53,54,55,56
• Indiana’s evaluation also examined whether the exclusion of NEMT benefits had different impacts for 
rural and urban enrollees, finding that a similar percentage of enrollees reported missing appoints, re-
gardless of whether or not they had access to NEMT and whether they lived in rural or urban counties.56 
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DISCUSSION
The five states examined in this brief used similar approaches in their 1115 waivers to promote personal re-
sponsibility in obtaining, maintaining and using health insurance coverage. In many ways, these states have 
used waiver authority to make Medicaid coverage operate more similarly to private coverage, through such 
provisions as imposing monthly insurance premiums and copayments, incorporating health savings accounts, 
excluding Medicaid benefits that typically are not included in private health insurance, and in some cases 
purchasing private coverage for Medicaid beneficiaries. 
Because these states’ 1115 Medicaid expansion waivers are relatively new, their impacts have not yet been 
fully evaluated. In some instances, related research suggests that certain provisions of these waivers may 
reduce Medicaid beneficiaries’ access to health coverage and services, but in other cases, early evidence 
suggests some provisions of the waivers may have limited or no significant impacts on beneficiaries. As states 
continue to experiment with their Medicaid programs, it will be important to monitor the findings from 1115 
waiver evaluations that are mandated by the ACA.
In contemplating the potential impacts of 1115 waiver provisions in Kentucky, it is worth considering the 
ways in which the commonwealth is similar or dissimilar to the study states examined in this brief. For ex-
ample, with 42% of Kentuckians living in rural areas, Kentucky more closely resembles Arkansas, Iowa and 
Montana than the more urban populations of Michigan and Indiana.57 This presents challenges in access to 
health care services because rural areas tend to have fewer health care providers.58 It also is important to 
note that some of the evidence related to 1115 waiver provisions comes from populations that differ from 
Medicaid enrollees. For example, much of the research on HSAs focuses on employer-sponsored insurance 
programs, but it is unclear how findings from these studies relate to lower-income Medicaid beneficiaries, 
since ESI coverage is more likely among individuals with higher incomes.59 
Additionally, unlike Kentucky, the study states in this brief used 1115 waiver authority as a means to imple-
ment their ACA Medicaid expansions from the beginning, rather than modify an existing traditional expan-
sion. Because Kentucky is one of the first states to pursue an 1115 waiver to change an established tradi-
tional expansion, it currently is unclear whether and how HHS may consider the state’s existing program as 
a potential benchmark in the federal approval process (e.g., requiring the state to attain similar enrollment 
compared to the existing expansion). 
___________________________
1  The ACA sets eligibility for expanded Medicaid to reach 133 percent of FPG. However, that threshold is based on 
modified adjusted gross income (MAGI), which provides a 5 percentage point income disregard, effectively increasing 
the income-eligibility threshold to 138 percent of FPG. Because FPG is calculated according to income and household 
size, the exact income for eligibility varies (e.g., 138% of FPG is $16,394 for a single person, or $33,534 for a family of 
four). More information is available at http://www.shadac.org/news/aca-note-when-133-equals-138-fpl-calculations-
affordable-care-act. 
2   As of May 2016, 31 states (including the District of Columbia) have expanded their Medicaid programs. Additionally, 
Louisiana has announced plans to expand its program in July 2016. Currently, 25 states operate under traditional ex-
pansions (Louisiana also plans a traditional expansion) and six operate under 1115 waivers. In some cases, states have 
changed their Medicaid expansion approaches. For example, Pennsylvania began its expansion with and 1115 waiver 
and transitioned to a traditional approach. Additionally, New Hampshire has implemented a planned transition from an 
initial traditional expansion to a waiver-based expansion.
3  Section 1115 waivers pre-date the Affordable Care Act (ACA), but this brief focuses on how these waivers have been 
used to implement the ACA’s Medicaid program expansions. The major provisions of Section 1115 did not change with 
the passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) but, the ACA did establish new transparency rules requiring periods of 
public notice and public comment at the state and federal level before new waivers and waiver extensions can receive 
federal approval.
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4  Rudowitz, R., and Musumeci, M. “The ACA and Medicaid Expansion Waivers.” Kaiser Family Foundation. 2014. Avail-
able at: http://kff.org/report-section/the-aca-and-medicaid-expansion-waivers-issue-brief/ 
5  While 1115 waivers are time-limited, they may be extended upon approval by the Secretary.
6  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. “Section 1115 Demonstrations.” Available at: https://www.medicaid.
gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/Section-1115-Demonstrations.html
7  Kaiser Family Foundation. “Medicaid and the Uninsured: Five Key Questions and Answers about Section 1115 Medic-
aid Demonstration Waivers.” 2011. Available at: https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8196.pdf
8  Rudowitz, R., Musumeci, M., and Gates, A. “Medicaid Expansion Waivers: What Will We Learn?” Kaiser Family Foun-
dation. 2016. Available at: http://kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-expansion-waivers-what-will-we-learn/ 
9  While HHS requires budget neutrality for 1115 demonstrations, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has 
voiced long-standing concern about HHS’s approval process for assessing and ensuring budget neutrality. According to 
the GAO, “these concerns have centered around how HHS allows states to use questionable methods and assumptions 
when developing cost projections that serve as the basis for demonstration spending limits, without providing ade-
quate documentation to support these projections.” If costs exceed expected federal expenditures, states must either 
request to adjust budget neutrality calculations due to changes in circumstance through an amendment or bear the 
costs themselves. More information is available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665265.pdf. 
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Arkansas Indiana Iowa Michigan Montana
Premium assistance
   Marketplace Mandatory enrollment 
of benefi ciaries in 
private Marketplace 
plans
N/A Originally, mandatory 
enrollment of benefi -
ciaries with incomes 
above 100% of FPG in 
private Marketplace 
plans; in subsequent 
years, made this 
opti onal in 2015 and 
disconti nued in 2016. 
Voluntary enrollment 
of benefi ciaries in 
private Marketplace 
plans, starti ng in 2018
N/A
      ESI N/A Voluntary enrollment 
in premium assistance 
for benefi ciaries with 
an employer off er of 
insurance
Mandatory enrollment 
in premium assistance 
for benefi ciaries with 




Premiums N/A N/A Based on income:
50% to 100% FPG - 
$5/month
More than 100% FPG - 
$10/month
Based on income:
More than 100% FPG -
2% of monthly income 
Based on income:
More than 50% FPG -




More than 99% FPG -
$10-25/month, 
depending on income 
Based on income:
5% or less FPG - 
$1/month 
More than 5% FPG - 
2% of monthly income
 N/A Quarterly HSA contri-
buti ons based on uti -
lizati on of health care 
services, regardless of 
income
N/A
   Non-payment
   penalty1
Enrollees become 
responsible for co-pays 
at the traditi onal Med-
icaid state plan level 
(see cost-sharing)
Based on income:
100% FPG or less 
-benefi ciary is given 
reduced benefi ts (no 
dental or vision) with 
co-pays at the traditi on-
al Medicaid state plan 
level (see cost-sharing)
More than 100% FPG- 
benefi ciary is disen-
rolled in program and 
locked out for 6 months 
Based on income:
More than 100% FPG -
benefi ciary is disen-
rolled from the 
program but may 
re-enroll without a 
lock-out period
N/A Based on income:
More than 100% FPG -
benefi ciary is disen-
rolled from the 
program (aft er a grace 
period of 90 days) and 
locked out unti l premi-
ums are paid or they 
are assessed to their 
state taxes (which the 
state will perform by 
end of the quarter)
   Restricti ons
   on coverage 
   start date
N/A No retroacti ve eligibil-
ity: Enrollees are not 
eligible for 90 days 
of retroacti ve cover-
age, typically off ered 
through Medicaid 
Enrollment date: 
Enrollment begins the 
fi rst day of the month 
when benefi ciaries pay 
their fi rst contributi on. 
Non-payment penalty 
based on income:
100% FPG or less - 
enrolled fi rst day of the 
month aft er a 60-day 
waiti ng period
More than 100% FPG -
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Arkansas Indiana Iowa Michigan Montana
Cost-sharing Based on income:
More than 99% FPG -
Co-pays as a penalty 
for non-payment of 
monthly contributi ons 
Non-emergency use 
of emergency depart-
ment:  Graduated 
co-pay — $8 co-pay for 
the fi rst ti me and $25 
for subsequent ti mes.2 
Co-pays as penalty: 
100% FPG or less-
Co-pays as a penalty 
for non-payment of 
monthly contributi ons 
Co-pays for non-emer-
gency use of the 
emergency department 
($8 per use, the max-
imum under federal 
regulati ons), regardless 
of income 
Tracks benefi ciaries’ 
uti lizati on of health 
care services and bills 
them quarterly for 
their cost-sharing, 
which is placed in 
benefi ciaries’ HSAs, 
regardless of income
This approach diff ers 




mum co-pays allowed 
under federal regu-
lati ons on enrollees, 
regardless of income.3 
Certain services are 
exempted from 
co-pays (e.g., pre-
venti ve, emergency, 
family-planning, 
pregnancy services). 
See footnote for 





N/A Enrollee can reduce 
their HSA contributi ons 
by engaging in certain 
healthy behaviors.5 
See footnote for list of 
behaviors.6
Enrollees are exempted 
from monthly premi-
ums if they complete a 
health risk assessment 
(HRA) and receive an 
annual wellness or 
dental exam
Enrollee can reduce 
premiums and HSA 
contributi ons by 
completi ng an HRA 






N/A Received authority to 
exclude non-emer-
gency transportati on 
benefi ts for one year 
(extended so the state 
can study the impacts).
Received authority to 
exclude non-emer-
gency transportati on 
benefi ts for one year 
(extended so the state 
can study the impacts).
N/A N/A
1  Each of the states in this brief make unpaid premiums/HSA contributi ons a debt owed to the state.
2  Because Secti on 1115 waivers do not allow authority to exceed federal regulati ons on maximum cost-sharing, Indiana obtained Secti on 1916(f) authority to 
impose a $25 co-pay.
3  The maximum cost-sharing allowable under federal regulati ons varies by individuals’ income and by the type of service. Accessible at: htt ps://www.medic-
aid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-informati on/by-topics/cost-sharing/cost-sharing-out-of-pocket-costs.html 
4  Individuals exempt from copayments include pregnant women and those age 20 and under. Services exempt from copayments include preventi ve health 
screenings, family planning, eyeglasses, transportati on, emergencies in the emergency room, immunizati ons, and medically necessary health screenings 
ordered by a health care provider. More informati on is available at: htt p://dphhs.mt.gov/helpplan 
5  Indiana eff ecti vely allows enrollees to reduce their HSA contributi ons by providing increased state matching funds when HSA dollars roll over into the next 
year, if enrollees complete certain healthy behaviors.
6  Individuals can receive healthy behavior incenti ves for appropriately uti lizing the following preventi ve care services: annual physical, cholesterol testi ng, 
blood glucose screening, tetanus-diphtheria screening, and fl u shot. For women, these preventi ve care services also include mammogram and pap smear. 
Accessible at: htt p://www.mhsindiana.com/fi les/2011/08/POWERAccount-Brochure-EN.pdf. 
7  In additi on to an HRA, benefi ciaries in Michigan’s Medicaid expansion may engage in other healthy behaviors for incenti ves. Accessible at: htt p://enroll-
michigan.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/healthy-michigan-plan-handbook-2.pdf 
